



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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## DIA SITUATION REPORT

#59

DATE: 20 October 1973

TIME: 1225 EDT

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST HOSTILITIES

REFERENCE: DIA Analysis

MORI/CDF  
C03340853  
pages 1-31. GENERAL

a. (S) The Israeli task force on the West Bank of the Suez Canal has changed a potential war of attrition into a war of movement, and decisive developments are said to be close at hand. Egypt, with most of its reserve forces already committed in an attempt to stem the Israeli invasion, may well be required to further weaken its forces along the East Bank.

b. (S) The possibility of an Israeli drive on Cairo is considered unlikely. Israeli objectives seem clear. They apparently plan to seize and destroy the Egyptian military infrastructure along the West Bank and inland to about 40 kilometers (25 nautical miles) and then conduct a final assault against what would be a weakened and highly vulnerable Egyptian Army. 25X1

d. (S/NFD) Action on the Syrian front centered on artillery exchanges between the Israelis and the combined Arab forces. Beyond the limited gains apparently made by the Jordanians and Iraqis yesterday, no further terrain has been acquired by the Arabs. Both Arab and Israeli forces along the Syrian front appear to be content to maintain their relative positions and have given no indications that any all-out offensive will take place soon.

NSA review completed

PREPARED BY:

RELEASED BY:

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reviews  
completed.

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## MIDDLE EAST HOSTILITIES, SITUATION REPORT #59

a. JORDAN

(S/NFD/CD) The RJAF has observed a dawn-to-dusk alert since commencement of hostilities. The King and his supporters have been able to keep the country's involvement confined to the armored brigade and infrequent air defensive patrols.

b. ALGERIA

1 (S/NFD) The Presidential delegation to Moscow came away from meetings with Soviet officials under the opinion that the USSR is not prepared to support the Arabs if they start losing the war. The Algerian feeling was that the fate of the war rested in Washington, D.C.


2 (S/NFD) On 14 October, a 250-truck convoy, apparently from Algiers, passed through Tripoli. The same day, a troop convoy larger than a brigade -- also reportedly from Algeria -- passed through Tobruk.

5. SOVIET-WARSAW PACT ACTIVITYa. SOVIET GROUND

(U) No change.

b. SOVIET NAVY

(S) There has been no major change in the status of the Mediterranean Squadron.



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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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**DIA SITUATION REPORT  
SUPPLEMENT**

59A

DATE: 20 October 1973

TIME: 1210 EDT

SUBJECT: Current Status of the Soviet  
Mediterranean Squadron

REFERENCE:

25X1

PREPARED BY:

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225X1

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Dir, J-5 (2 cy, 1 cy BG Christensen) Rm 7E964  
Dir, J-6  
Asst Sec

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CIA (NMCC Rep) (2 cys, 1 to DCI/IC/ISG)  
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DNA (via ISG courier)

2. (S)

The Soviet submarines and surface combatants now deployed in the Mediterranean have a considerable offensive capability. But if the Soviets wanted to attain a better offensive posture, they could have cancelled the 5 October departure of the KARA, the Soviet Navy's most modern guided missile light cruiser; deployed their command light cruiser, ZHDANOV, from the Black Sea to provide the best available command and control communications; and sent the MOSKVA, also from the Black Sea, for seaborne helicopter support.

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5. (S) The build-up most likely is intended to achieve all of the following purposes:

- To provide a contingency force for the protection of Soviet ships and aircraft should the Israeli's decide to attack those Soviet units delivering arms to Syria and Egypt, and to cover the evacuation of Soviet personnel and equipment from threatened areas.

- To make a show of force, primarily for the benefit of the Arab states, while demonstrating to all observers a capability to react in strength to crises affecting areas of Soviet interest.

- To provide air control and search and rescue support to Soviet aircraft involved in the Middle East airlift.

- To provide surveillance and tracking of U.S. Sixth Fleet units, including increased intelligence collection; and to provide a ready force for employment should a US/USSR confrontation develop out of the on-going hostilities.

- To collect intelligence against Israel and the Arab states.